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The science of complex systems has tended to assign a central role to the concept 
of emergence. But how precise or coherent is this concept? Three alternative 
approaches to answering this question are discussed. Firstly, we examine specific 
examples of emergence, using the Pauli Exclusion Principle as the main case 
study. Secondly, we survey alternative kinds of definitions of emergence that 
have been offered in the literature. Thirdly, we address the possibility that the 
concept of emergence is in some sense undefinable. We conclude that emergence 
remains problematic, in particular because it is difficult to circumscribe a concept 
that avoids two extremes whereby either nothing is emergent (i.e. the concept is 
vacuous) or everything is emergent (i.e. the concept is trivial).
Keywords: emergence, complexity, definition, Pauli Exclusion Principle, 
ontology, epistemology
Introduction
Over the past decade or so, there has been an enormous rise in interest among 
scientists in issues concerning complexity, complex systems, cellular automata, and 
the like. To a large extent this interest has not been reflected in the philosophical 
community. My topic in this paper concerns one key concept that often features 
centrally in discussions of complex systems. This concept is emergence.
Consider the following excerpt from a recent survey paper by the director of 
the Institute for the Study of Complex Systems (ISCS):
“If ‘complexity’ is currently the buzzword of choice for our newly minted millen-
nium – as many theorists proclaim – ‘emergence’ seems to be the explication of 
the hour for how complexity has evolved. Complexity, it is said, is an emergent 
phenomenon. Emergence is what ‘self-organizing’ processes produce. Emergence 
is the reason why there are hurricanes, and ecosystems, and complex organisms 
like humankind, not to mention traffic congestion and rock concerts. Indeed the 
term is positively awe-inspiring. As physicist Doyne Farmer observed: “It’s not 
magic … but it feels like magic.””1
Why focus philosophical attention on emergence? One reason is already 
illustrated by the quotation given above, namely the alleged significance 
1 Corning [2002, p. 1].
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of emergence and of emergent phenomena. In some ways, the pressure to 
demonstrate this significance has mutually conflicting effects. One way a 
phenomenon can be significant is to occur frequently across a wide range of 
important contexts. Conversely, the significance of a phenomenon can also lie 
in it being unusual, special, rare. As we shall see, each of these features has 
been claimed by theorists for the concept of emergence.
The following anecdote may help to illustrate the predicament. In June 2002 I 
attended the 4th International Conference on Complex Systems in Nashua, New 
Hampshire. One of the core themes of the conference was emergence. About 
halfway through the week-long conference, an audience member stood up during 
the question period following a talk and asserted that there are, in fact, no genuine 
cases of emergence. This provoked animated discussion and led to an ongoing 
debate during the remainder of the conference, with people on both sides of the 
issue. As a (then) outsider to the complex systems community, I was startled by the 
lack of consensus about this apparently very basic question. It was as if I had gone 
to a paleontology conference and halfway through a debate had broken out over 
whether dinosaurs ever existed! This episode is but one illustration of what I think 
is a more general phenomenon: there is widespread usage of the term “emergence” 
in the complexity literature, yet little agreement over what it means or how it might 
be precisely defined. This leads me to my core question: what is “emergence”?
My question is meant as a philosophical request for clarification. As such, 
there are several potential approaches to trying to answer it. One approach is to 
provide paradigm examples of emergence in action, exemplars which illustrate 
what the concept is and how it works. A second approach is to formulate an explicit 
definition of the term “emergence.” And a third and final approach is to give 
arguments for why no genuine clarification of the term is possible. In what follows 
I shall spend some time considering each of these three approaches in turn.
Section 1: An Example of Emergence?
I shall take my main (alleged) example of emergence from Harold 
Morowitz’s 2004 book, The Emergence of Everything. In the early chapters of 
the book, Morowitz stresses the link between emergence and what he describes 
as “pruning rules.” Here are three sample quotes:
“[S]cientists have looked for ways of pruning the space of possible solutions or sets 
of allowable solutions. This may lead to surprises in the system trajectories, giving 
rise to novel behaviors. These are the emergent properties of the system, properties 
of the whole. They are novelties that follow from the system rules but cannot be 
predicted from properties of the components that make up the system.”2
“[N]ature yields at every level novel structures and behaviors selected from the 
huge domain of the possible by pruning, which extracts the actual from the possible. 
2  Morowitz [2004, p. 13].
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The pruning rules are the least understood aspect of this approach to emergence, 
and understanding them will be a major feature of the science of the future.”3
“[The computational approach is] to select solutions or families of solutions 
by fitness rules or other selection criteria often defined by introducing pruning 
algorithms. Theories of this kind are successful if the … solutions generated under 
the constraint of rules and pruning lead to behaviors with some kind of agreement 
or resonance with the world of observation. Such outputs are called emergent 
properties of the system.”4
One question here is whether the notion of a “pruning rule” is itself 
transparent enough to help in clarifying emergence. For one thing, Morowitz 
always talks of pruning rules in the context of models. But what are supposed to 
be the real-world analogs of pruning rules? In the course of the whole book, only 
one explicit example is presented, which is the Pauli Exclusion Principle. When 
describing the allegedly emergent properties of the periodic table of chemical 
elements, Morowitz writes
“The pruning relations that severely limit the eigen states (allowable atomic 
configurations) of matter are the solutions to the Schrödinger equation and the 
Pauli exclusion principle. The emergent behavior is the content of the science of 
chemistry: the periodic table of the elements, the rules of covalent bonding, etc.”5
What exactly is the Pauli Exclusion Principle (PEP)? One way of stating it is 
as follows:
PEP   No two electrons in an atom can have the same four quantum numbers.
As Morowitz describes it, PEP follows from the more general mathematical 
rule that functions representing states of two electrons must be antisymmetric. 
This in turn follows (although Morowitz does not mention this) from a more 
general rule which covers all fermions (i.e. particles with ½-integer spin).6
So much for the content of PEP. The key question is what makes PEP special, 
and thus a candidate for creating emergent properties. How, in other words, is 
PEP different from a typical law of nature such as Newton’s Law of Gravitation? 
In answering this question, let us first dispose of two potentially distinctive 
features of PEP which do not seem to be relevant here. Firstly, PEP is quantum 
mechanical in nature. It is hard to see, however, how this can be the operative 
feature linking PEP to emergence. (Indeed, if anything, the association with 
quantum mechanics may give rise to the suspicion that one mystery (emergence) 
is being ‘explained’ by invoking another mystery (quantum mechanics), as – for 
example – Roger Penrose has done with his attempts to root consciousness in the 
A. Baker. Complex Thinking: The Emergence of Everything?
3  op. cit., p. 14.
4  op. cit., p. 19.
5  op. cit., p. 55.
6  This is in contrast to bosons, which have integer spin, and which do not obey PEP.
139
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peculiarities of quantum mechanics.7) Secondly, at several points in his exposition 
Morowitz refers to PEP as a “selection rule.” It should be noted that this term has 
quite a specific meaning in physics (and rather different, evolutionary overtones 
in biology). In the context of physics, a selection rule is a restriction on the 
space of possibilities arising from underlying symmetries, which correspond to 
conserved properties of the system. An example is Noether’s Law, which states 
that continuous symmetries always give rise to conserved properties (e.g. angular 
momentum). In this technical sense, it is not even clear whether PEP is a selection 
rule: it relies on antisymmetry, not symmetry; and it is discrete, not continuous.
So what feature or features of PEP might provide the necessary link to 
emergence? Morowitz makes three central claims about the nature of PEP:8
(i) PEP is unrelated to the other laws of physics.
(ii) PEP has nothing to say about the behavior of individual electrons.
(iii) PEP is a nondynamical principle, but it influences the dynamical 
behavior of electrons.
One problem here is that Morowitz is not himself a particle physicist. The 
consensus among the several particle physicists I have consulted is that (i) is 
false, (ii) is true – though not especially significant –, and (iii) is unclear. Let us 
take the three claims in order.
(i) PEP is unrelated to the other laws of physics.
There is a sense in which this is true in quantum mechanics. However it 
is false in quantum field theory. (Quantum field theory is a theory for many-
body systems which allows for the creation and annihilation of particles, 
unlike quantum mechanics.) In quantum mechanics, the antisymmetric rule of 
PEP must be added ‘by hand.’ It is not ‘forced’ by the underlying formalism 
of the theory. The opposite is true in quantum field theory; in fact, dropping 
antisymmetry for half-integer-spin particles leads to violations of causality. 
Hence it seems fair to say that PEP does follow from other aspects of the theory 
in quantum field theory (assuming that probabilities are preserved).9
(ii) PEP has nothing to say about the behavior of individual electrons.
This is true in the sense that if there is just one electron in the system there 
is nothing to exclude. But if this is all that is meant then the point can be made 
less confusingly by saying that the properties imparted by PEP on a single 
electron are relational. In this sense, the laws of genetics similarly have nothing 
to say about isolated (sexually reproducing) organisms.
7  Penrose [1989].
8  op. cit., pp. 55–6.
9  Another way of explicating the above point is in terms of position functions. (Dr. Leonidas Pantelidis 
(personal communication)).
140
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A second, more technical, objection to claim (ii) is that it confuses an 
epistemological point with a metaphysical one. Electrons have spin ½, which – 
given PEP – means that a 2π rotation brings the state back to minus itself (i.e. its 
wavefunction picks up a phase of –1). However, probabilities in quantum mechanics 
are related to the square of the wavefunction, hence the only way to observe this 
phase change is to have one electron interfere with another one. This does not imply 
that PEP “has nothing to say” in the single electron case, only that what PEP says 
cannot be verified without having the single electron interact with other electrons.
(iii) PEP is a nondynamical principle, but it influences the dynamical behavior 
of electrons.
Something is dynamical, in the physicist’s sense, if it is related to force. PEP 
does not depend on the existence of forces, so in this sense it is non-dynamical. 
Also, there is a sense in which PEP does have dynamical consequences. It 
implies, for example, that the probability of two electrons being in a certain pair 
of positions decreases as those positions get closer.10 Thus (iii) does seem to be 
basically accurate as a claim about PEP. The question remains, however, of why 
being a nondynamical principle with dynamical consequences makes PEP such a 
prime candidate for producing emergent behavior. Unfortunately, Morowitz says 
nothing in his book that casts light on this mystery.
Section 2: A Definition of Emergence?
My complaint against Pauli’s Exclusion Principle is not that it fails to 
generate emergent phenomena – I have remained neutral on this issue. Rather it 
is that nothing very illuminating has been said about why PEP is such a paradigm 
case of emergence. The broader point here is that examples in themselves are 
unlikely to illuminate a given concept. A proposed example may be rejected by 
some, and even if it is accepted, at least provisionally, there still tends to remain 
the above sort of why-question. Examples provide good test-cases for candidate 
definitions, but they cannot fully replace the definition seeking process.
What, then, are the prospects for a philosophically satisfying definition 
of emergence? I mentioned at the beginning of this paper the tensions arising 
from theorists’ desires to show the significance of emergence. If too many kinds 
of phenomena are emergent then the concept becomes less distinctive, more 
commonplace. If, on the other hand, emergent phenomena are too few and far 
between then the concept becomes esoteric and irrelevant. At the fullest extremes 
in these two directions lie pitfalls which must be avoided when defining any 
substantive concept: these mirror-image pitfalls are vacuousness and triviality.
(i) Vacuousness: a concept, F, is vacuous if nothing is F
(ii) Triviality: a concept, F, is trivial if everything is F
A. Baker. Complex Thinking: The Emergence of Everything?
10  This makes PEP dynamically equivalent to a repulsive force (in a classical system).
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Another way of putting the definitional question, then, is as follows: is it 
possible to come up with a reasonably precise definition of emergence which 
does not include everything (i.e. is non-trivial), but does include some things 
(i.e. is non-vacuous)?
Space precludes all but a very general sketch of the possibilities for defining 
emergence. The scattered literature on emergence includes a large number of 
proposed definitions, characterizations, and criteria for emergence, as well as 
various ways of slicing the concept up into different sub-concepts. For clarity 
of exposition, I shall classify kinds of definition into three broad categories: 
ontological, epistemological, and complexity-related.
2(A) Ontological Definitions of Emergence
Perhaps the most common phrase associated with emergence is the claim 
that, in a genuinely emergent system, “The whole is more than the sum of the 
parts.”11 Unfortunately this is more of a slogan than a precise definition. For 
one thing, it is unclear whether this is supposed to be just a necessary condition 
for emergence, a sufficient condition, or both. For another thing, the key terms 
in the slogan are not transparent. What does ‘more than’ mean? What does 
‘sum’ mean? Consider two systems each of which consists merely of four coins 
arranged on a table:
(i) C C  (ii) C C C C
 C C
The systems (i) and (ii) have qualitatively identical parts: each consists 
of four coins of the same size, shape, etc. Are these two systems more than the 
‘sum of their parts’? In one sense, at least, it seems we should answer yes. If 
we take the term “sum” here seriously, then it should share the basic properties 
of the mathematical operation of summation. For finite numbers of inputs, a 
mathematical sum has two important properties. Firstly, it is a function, so the 
same inputs are mapped onto the same outputs. Secondly, the arrangement 
(including the order) of the inputs makes no difference to the overall output. In 
the above case, systems (i) and (ii) have the same inputs, just arranged differently, 
but different outputs. Hence (i) and (ii) are more than the sum of their parts.
On the other hand, (i) and (ii) are about as simple as systems can get, and 
about as uninteresting too. Surely if we can find emergence even in very basic 
systems of this sort, then the threat of triviality is very real. David Chalmers 
has similar qualms about the following, more definition-like version of the 
above slogan:12
11  e.g. “Emergence leads to novelties: the whole is somehow different from the sum of the parts.” (Morowitz 
[2004, p. 20]).
12  Chalmers [1990, p. 1].
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(1) Emergence involves whole systems having properties which are not 
possessed by any of their parts.
While (1) may sound promising, insofar as it covers instances such as (brain-
level) consciousness arising from unconscious neurons, or geometrical patterns 
arising from the chemical reaction of unpatterned molecules, it also falls prey 
to triviality. It is not hard to find properties that systems (i) and (ii) each have 
and yet none of their parts have: for example, having 4 distinct components, or 
having a total mass of X grams. Indeed it seems that any system will have some 
properties not possessed by any of its parts.
One way to refine (1) so as to avoid this triviality is to place some restriction 
on the kinds of higher level properties which count. For example, we might try
(2) Emergence involves whole systems having properties which are 
qualitatively different from those possessed by any of their parts.
The idea is that the properties mentioned above in connection with systems 
(i) and (ii) – having 4 distinct components, having a mass of X grams – are 
not qualitatively different from properties possessed by individual coins or by 
subclusters of coins in the systems.
For (2) to be useful as a definition, however, it must be possible to 
specify what qualitative difference amounts to without invoking emergence. 
And it unclear whether this can be done. For example, is nonlinear behavior 
qualitatively different from linear behavior? (In other words, if various linear 
components interact to produce an overall nonlinear effect, is this emergence?) 
And what about a lump of fissile radioactive material to which more and more 
atoms are gradually added: when the mass reaches criticality and a chain 
reaction ensues, is this a qualitatively different piece of behavior?
2(B) Epistemological Definitions of Emergence
A second widely-used approach is to define emergence for a system by 
reference to the difficulty of predicting the behavior of the system. For example,
(3) A system is emergent if and only if it is impossible to predict the behavior 
of the whole just on the basis of the behavior of its separate parts.
Crucial to the force of (3) is whether the impossibility referred to means 
impossible in practice or impossible in principle.13 Each choice has its 
drawbacks. If we go with the ‘in practice’ reading then – as many philosophers 
have complained – we are turning emergence into a highly subjective notion. 
We can no longer talk about a system being emergent or non-emergent per 
se, but only emergent-relative-to-us. Logically very straightforward systems, 
A. Baker. Complex Thinking: The Emergence of Everything?
13  e.g. “[T]he behavior of the agents leads to system properties not knowable without running the program.” 
(Morowitz [2004, p.23]).
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for example the game of chess, may turn out to be emergent in this subjective 
sense simply in virtue of being sufficiently computationally complex to exhaust 
our powers of direct analysis. On the other hand, if we choose the ‘impossible 
in principle’ interpretation, we face the prospect of the concept collapsing in 
the opposite direction to vacuousness. If we think of the ‘in principle’ stance 
as taking a God’s-eye view, then it may be that nothing is genuinely emergent 
because everything is in principle predictable. In particular, there would seem 
to be no room for emergence in a fully deterministic universe.
2(C) Complexity-Related Definitions of Emergence
As has already been mentioned, emergence crops up frequently in 
discussions of complex systems. One common approach to characterizing 
emergence is to define it in terms of complexity. A distinction is sometimes 
made by theorists analyzing the concept of emergence between synchronic 
emergence and diachronic emergence. Roughly speaking, synchronic 
emergence involves the relations between different levels of a system at a given 
point in time, while diachronic emergence involves the relations between earlier 
and later states of the same system. Complexity-related definitions of emergence 
also tend to fall into one or other of these two categories.
Let us consider first synchronic emergence. What is striking about 
definitions falling in this category is that two quite contrary relations have been 
invoked. On the one hand, there are definitions along the following lines:14
(4) Emergent systems are those in which low-level complexity produces 
certain very simple behaviors at a higher-level.
The appeal of (4) is twofold. Firstly, it fits well with some of the canonical 
examples of emergence in complex systems: for example, circadian rhythms 
in humans, or seasonal fluctuations in air temperature. In such cases the 
underlying systems (the human organism, the atmosphere) are enormously 
complex, yet surprisingly simple regularities ‘emerge.’ Secondly, (4) boosts 
the claims of complex systems proponents who argue that the evolving field of 
complexity science is right to look for commonalities across different complex 
systems in diverse contexts. If the emergence of simple higher-level patterns is 
characteristic of such systems then the chances of these patterns being shared 
look better than they might otherwise at first glance.
Ranged against (4) are definitions which make the simplicity-complexity 
link in precisely the opposite direction. For example,
(5) Emergent systems are those in which low-level simplicity produces 
certain very complex behaviors at a higher-level.
14  One example is from Cohen & Stewart [1994, p. 411], who write: “We shall give the name ‘simplexity’ to the 
process whereby a system of rule can engender simple features. … Another word with a very similar meaning is 
Stuart Kaufmann’s concept of antichaos: the occurrence of simple large-scale behavior in complicated systems.”
144
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What proponents of (5) tend to have in mind are multi-agent systems in 
which the individual agents interact according to very simple, and often very 
local, rules. Examples include anthills and groups of birds. Such systems often 
exhibit seemingly quite sophisticated behavior at the global level – rallying 
to defend the nest, for example, or flocking in complex patterns. Interesting 
behavior is somehow arising, or ‘emerging’, from very basic foundations.
The contrary directions of definitions (4) and (5) provide a nice illustration 
of the competing pressures to play up the significance of emergence. By 
emphasizing potential commonalities across different complex systems, (4) 
roots the significance of emergence in its link to simplicity. By contrast, (5) 
equates simplicity with uninterestingness. What emergence does, on this second 
view, is somehow produce interesting – and thus significant – complexity from 
seemingly uninteresting component materials.
What about diachronic emergence? In this case, theorists seem to be in 
general agreement about the direction of the relation between earlier and later 
stages in a system which exhibits emergence. The laws of thermodynamics tell 
is that systems are likely in general, and in the long run, to evolve from more 
ordered states to less ordered states. In other words, disorder – or entropy – 
tends to increase. A putative characteristic of emergent systems, by contrast, is 
that disorder tends to decrease.15 The issue then is how to connect decreasing 
disorder to the changing complexity of a system over time. Does order enhance 
complexity or reduce it? Unfortunately for the prospects of a definition of 
diachronic emergence based on complexity, it seems like there is no general 
answer to this question other than, “It depends.”
It depends on the degree of complexity of the system we start out with. 
If enough disorder is imposed on an organism it will most likely die. And a 
dead organism is presumably less complex than a live one, so here increasing 
disorder decreases complexity. On the other hand, if we impose some disorder 
on a crystal lattice then it will become more complex, so here increasing 
disorder seems to increase complexity. The salient difference between the 
organism and the crystal lies in the comparative simplicity of the latter in 
comparison to the former.
It also depends on the length of time the system is left to evolve. Consider 
an array of qualitatively identical iron nails. If they are left alone then they will 
gradually start to rust. Different nails may exhibit slightly different patterns 
of rusting, which will render them qualitatively different and hence make the 
array as a whole more complex. But in the long run all the nails will rust down 
to a fine powder and the total system of iron powder will be simple, perhaps 
even simpler than the original array of nails. So here progressive disorder first 
increases, then decreases the complexity of the system.
A. Baker. Complex Thinking: The Emergence of Everything?
15  See, for example, the title of John Holland’s 1998 book, Emergence: From Chaos to Order.
145
yearbook-II.indd   145 2007.09.26.   10:39:20
Complex Cognition and Qualitative Science: A Legacy of Oswald Külpe
The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication – Vol. 2 
The fundamental problem here is that there is no straightforward 
relationship between complexity and disorder. Highly complex systems in fact 
seem to consist of a mixture of ordered and disordered features. Hence both a 
significant increase in disorder and a significant decrease in disorder may act 
to reduce the overall complexity of the system. This balance between order and 
disorder is reflected in our epistemological interactions with complex systems. 
Such systems are typically neither completely predictable nor completely 
unpredictable. A paradigm case here is the weather: many aspects of weather 
are predictable given our current computational resources – we can make 
reasonably accurate short-term forecasts, and spot longer-term trends. But for 
most areas it is impossible to accurately predict what the weather will be like 
two weeks from now. Indeed one popular approach to defining complexity is 
based on measuring the difficulty of describing the ‘interesting’ features of a 
given system. Highly ordered systems come out as relatively simple, because 
their main features can be concisely described. And highly disordered systems, 
for example chaotic systems, also come out as relatively simple, because they 
have few interesting features to describe.
Section 3: Is Emergence Undefinable?
Our inability to come up with a fully adequate definition of the concept of 
emergence does not, of course, show that such a definition does not exist. But 
are there independent reasons for pessimism concerning the definability of 
emergence? There are certainly plenty of examples in the literature of pessimism 
of this sort. Thus John Holland writes near the beginning of his book,
“It is unlikely that a topic as complicated as emergence will submit meekly to a 
concise definition, and I have no such definition to offer.”16
Below I shall consider three possible reasons for claiming that emergence is 
not definable, or at least not definable in any feasible manner.
The first reason, mentioned by Morowitz in the more speculative chapters at 
the end of his book, is that attempts to reflect upon and to analyze the concept 
of emergence involve some kind of circularity. Morowitz writes,
“In the emergence approach, we have operated in a circular fashion. … [W]e 
have started with the mind … and have built a universe of constructs that are then 
used in an effort to try to understand the mind.”17
A little later in the book, Morowitz returns to this theme, writing
“Emergence has in an orderly way moved from protons to philosophers. At this 
level there is a kind of closing of the loop. … The emerging world turns inwards 
and thinks about itself.”
16  op. cit., p. 3.
17  Morowitz [2004, p. 173].
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But how significant is this alleged circularity? After all, not all circularity is 
problematic. (For example, it is not generally considered to be problematic to give 
deductive arguments in support of the validity of deduction.) Perhaps Morowitz’s 
worry stems from the nature of philosophical inquiry. Like logic and mathematics, 
philosophical claims can sometimes fall under their own scope.18 In the case of 
philosophy this is because its scope of inquiry is by nature general. Hence it may 
make universal claims such that these claims are part of their own domain of 
application. In this respect, philosophy is unlike most other disciplines: the claims 
of biology, for example, are not themselves biological phenomena. Such circularity 
can lead to paradox. For example, “All generalizations are false,” does not seem 
to be capable of having a truth-value assigned to it on pain of contradiction. But 
Morowitz has done nothing to show that any such paradoxes threaten the concept 
of emergence. Even if he is right that the mental apparatus which philosophers 
use to concoct definitions of emergence itself emerges from lower-level neuronal, 
molecular, and sub-atomic activity, why should this preclude the possibility of a 
cogent and paradox-free definition?
The second reason for pessimism about defining emergence links back to 
our discussion of complexity-related definitions at the end of Section 2. The 
worry is not that there is any direct circularity in the concept of emergence, 
but rather that the only way to define it brings in other concepts – such as 
complexity – which can themselves only be defined in relation to emergence. In 
other words we end up with a tight circle of interrelated concepts that have so 
little external underpinning that they are practically useless.
The third reason for pessimism is in some sense a blending of the first 
two reasons, and is related to Holland’s remark, quoted above, that the topic 
of emergence is “complicated.” This may turn out to be a consequence of the 
close links between emergence and complexity. As we have seen, it is not clear 
how to understand the claim that emergence is itself somehow emergent, nor 
why this should pose problems for defining emergence. Perhaps more plausible, 
however, is that complexity is itself a complex notion. If so, and if it is right to 
associate complexity with difficulty of description, then this would explain why 
it is so hard to come up with an adequate definition of emergence. It might also 
help to explain the intuition that emergence is an ‘interesting’ and ‘significant’ 
phenomenon, as mentioned at the beginning of the paper.
Conclusion
It is hard to see how – as it stands – the concept of emergence can do much 
in the way of explanatory work in either scientific or philosophical contexts. As 
we have seen, the concept as a whole is often conflated with various distinct 
sub-concepts: ontological versus epistemological emergence, synchronic 
versus diachronic, strong versus weak, and so on. Nor are these sub-concepts 
A. Baker. Complex Thinking: The Emergence of Everything? 147
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themselves generally amenable to straightforward definition. And there is 
a sense that each new theorist comes into the field ‘fresh’ and defines his or 
her own new version of the concept from scratch. It may be that in this respect 
complexity is actually a more tractable concept than emergence. As with 
emergence, various more specific kinds of complexity can be distinguished: 
Kolmogorov complexity, computational complexity, algorithmic complexity, and 
so on. The difference is that many of these specific kinds have become standard 
in the literature, and (probably not coincidentally) many of these specific kinds 
have also been given precise, mathematical definitions.
Furthermore, there is a tension arising from the proclaimed significance 
of emergence that pulls both in the direction of showing that emergent 
phenomena are to be found all over the place and in the direction of bracketing 
off emergence as a unique and distinctive occurrence. A second tension 
arises from competing aspirations for what the concept should be able to do. 
Emergent phenomena are supposed to be both genuinely novel but also rooted 
‘non-magically’ in their initial conditions or microstates. Wanting it both ways 
accounts, for example, for the appeal of “emergentism” in the philosophy of 
mind. If successful, then treating consciousness as an emergent phenomenon 
holds out the hope of explaining both the distinctiveness and the metaphysical 
naturalness of the mental. But the suspicion remains that wishful thinking 
is, at least in part, replacing rigorous philosophical analysis of the concept. 
Emergence ends up being whatever you want (or need) it to be … .19
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